

Transnational Labour, Global Restructuring and Transnational Corporations: The Ironies and Possibilities of Globalization in the Age of Rollerball Capitalism
Nathan Lillie (Univ of Groningen) and Miguel Martínez Lucio (Univ of Manchester)
Communication Paper IIRA 2009 Sydney

I. Introduction:

The idea of competition as a driving force for economic progress is inextricably intertwined with the concept of globalization. Global firms compete in global markets, while workers, localities and “competition states” compete for the favor of these global firms. Within these global firms, internally generated competition ensures that not even the people who are supposed to be on your side in the global rat race really are. Inter- and supra-national agencies such as the WTO, IMF and EU Commission apply sanctions to countries, or even companies, lacking the discipline to play by the rules of competition. And the unions whose job it would be to regulate competition between workers more often than not find themselves as caught up as anyone in the spirit of capitalism. Transnational corporations use the competitive impetus of globalization to transform work and labour relations, setting unions into competitive games, and bringing new tensions and contradictions to trade union work. Given this, we develop our work on trade union internationalism (Lillie and Martínez Lucio, 2004), in which we argue that trans- and inter- national union strategies can only be understood in the context of the interaction between unions’ embeddedness in national regulation, and globalizing production, resulting in transnational unionism consisting of a set of relationships between competing national players with competing visions of the ‘global’ within global production structures. Because it depends on voluntary networks rather than on the sort of bureaucratic authority used for national bargaining, in the absence of a convincing radical counter-narrative to that of global capitalism, the depth of transnational network-based union cooperation must necessarily be limited at best to that supported by the interests of the actors at a given juncture. Although, unlike the labour movement, capital can work effectively through network-based globalization, new tensions and ironies nonetheless emerge. Through its construction of a mythology in which globalization and competition are inextricably connected, capital is caught between engaging with and re-shaping unions and labor regulation and undermining them at the same time. Any discussion of the role of transnational corporations must not only realize that they can hold nations ‘hostage’ but also that the very nature of the ‘hostage-taking’ relies on an ambivalent relation with national industrial relations systems, unions and the state. Differences in structures of regulation and variation in configurations capital, labour and the state at various levels is a vector across which transnational corporations construct their strategies of control. Regulation is not so much avoided by transnational corporations as engaged with in a game to play one set off actors off against another. The behavior of transnational corporations is both about engaging and playing-off national environments against each other, as well as constructing a genuinely global business environment. The irony is that the ‘global’ and the play of politics around the global requires, and indeed as in some cases manufactures, differences so that competitive relations can be sustained. The transnational whipsawing frequently referred to in the industrial relations literature (Mueller and Purcell, 1992) is predicated on the construction of a dominant narrative of competition, specifying who is competing and on what basis. Although the narrative can be contested, by and large the labour movement does not attempt this, but rather attempts to function within it (Greer, 2005; Anner, Greer, Hauptmeier, Lillie & Winchester, 2006; Greer and Hauptmeier, 2008) which is an irony we allude to in this paper. Constructing competition in the market and in terms of different regulatory regimes requires constructing (or preserving) regulatory difference. Therefore capital cannot escape regulation but has to engage in it even during its ‘flight’ from it.

II. Globalization as Reality and Strategy

Some have argued that labor’s weakness when faced with capital mobility is not fundamentally new, but rather just another shift in the locus of the “core” of the world system, to new and cheaper locations (Silver 2003). While there undoubtedly has been a shift in production locations, globalization

changes more than just the places where things are made. TNCs emerge as new power centers, exploiting or creating competitive relationships between suppliers, unions, communities, and even their own subsidiaries, in order to strengthen and intensify corporate control. In constructing a new competitive game, more vicious and unforgiving than the old regulated game within the nation-state framework, capital produces a shifting new terrain of class conflict, altering power hierarchies within and between states, firms and unions. The reciprocity (albeit varied) that exists between the actors of the nation state is to some extent broken by transnational corporations that play between nation states. Business executives regard globalization as an imperative to act; in the context of the capitalist ethos of competition, to NOT constantly revolutionize the means of production through “globalizing” is to be old fashion and parochial (Sklair 2001). Thus, as Cameron and Palan (2004) observe, globalization is both a myth and a reality, and the development of each is dependant on the other. The myth of globalization guides action, which in turn produces the reality of globalization. But the myth must be plausible to capture the imagination of decision makers. Actors face a concrete reality of globalization produced by themselves and other actors, even if this reality began as a constructed narrative (Cameron and Palan 2004). Likewise, competition is socially constructed as a logical (indeed, driving) part of the globalization myth, but this in no way changes the reality faced by unions and other actors caught in new competitive frameworks. It does, however, raise the possibility of a way out, through the construction of new alternative narratives. These have an uphill struggle to gain plausibility in the face of a reality created by the dominate narrative of competition. Building resistance in the context of competitive relations between different clusters of organized labour becomes a difficult challenge. There is a tendency to see labour as simply locked into national frameworks as if the national was static for labour whilst it is clearly transforming in terms of capital (see Strange, 2007, and his critique of Radice, 1999). The shifting geographic scale of capitalist production and accumulation to the transnational level is a part of this ongoing process of segmentation and class conflict (Gough 2004), as firms seek cost and operational advantages within their pursuit of profitability and expansion. Like the division of labour in factories, transnational production allows capital greater control over the production process, and helps to obscure the relations of production in such a way as to make it more difficult for workers to recover a share of the extracted surplus value. Different parts of interconnected production processes locate in different jurisdictions, often in different countries, complicating the construction of worker solidarity and the maintenance of appropriately structured trade unions. Ultimately, this is because to maintain labor’s organizational strength in the face of the shifting geography of capital, it would be necessary to constantly revise and renew union organizations and worker solidarities out of the fragmented relations dispersed groups of workers within firms and industries. Thus, the shifting geographical division of labour is as much determined by management’s need to increase its control and extract surplus as is the organization of work within a factory on the shop floor. Each geographical organization of production is at least initially less amenable to worker resistance – if nothing else because one motivating factor in capital’s restructuring along transnational lines is to reduce the capacity of workers to resist.

The irony here is that at the same time as capital escapes regulatory contexts and national systems in search of increased value and surpluses, it also re-encounters regulatory systems. This creates a constant dilemma for capital in terms of escaping, encountering and rethinking relations within and between contexts. In a sense, however, focusing on the inevitability of re-regulation, and the sometimes high cost to capital of regulatory flux, misses the point. Capital is not only seeking a ‘spatial fix’ by seeking more attractive locations (Silver 2003), but is also seeking to ‘fix’ the spaces it is already by making the smaller spaces part of a larger, global competitive space, in which they can be compared. Transnational capital moves in part to encourage the perception that it is able to move production and investment in such a way that its very mobility can lever concessions and compliance from the organized labour movement and even the state (Mueller and Purcell, 1992). These are some of the key advantages to capital provided by globalization and international production structures which lead to ‘hegemonic despotism’ (Burawoy, 1985). For the myth connecting globalization and competition to be plausible and convincing, there must from time to time be real

losers, who face real consequences, in terms of lost jobs and shattered lives. The way in which capital constructs competition, and builds it into an ever tightening set of competitive rules, is reminiscent of the 1970s classic science fiction film *Rollerball*,¹ which depicts a dystopian 21st century future in which a handful of transnational corporations rule the world, demanding absolute obedience of all citizens.² Transnational firms construct competition between corporations and their headquarters cities in the form of *Rollerball* – a violent game designed to sustain ‘warlike’ tendencies and to provide a cloak of meaning for the global corporations by having a team within this sport which is fervently followed by the masses. The aim is to create the illusion of competition and maintain differences in loyalties be it the color of the apparel worn by the teams, their location and their corporate affiliation. When one player, the film’s protagonist Jonathon E, becomes so successful and popular that the corporations feel threatened, they begin to change the rules, hoping that Jonathon E will be killed or quit the game. In the film the reality of a world ruled by collusion between monopolistic transnational firms is concealed behind the symbolic fantasy of team sport competition, real in its deadly consequences and material rewards to participants, but unreflective of the underlying power structures and struggles.

As in the film, in reality transnational firms construct difference, not only between rival firms but also within companies between factories, work groups or even individuals (see Garrahan and Stewart, 1992 on teamwork as competition in Japanese transnational corporations). Transnational corporations play on local difference and national identity in forming competitive relations between groups and nations in order to gain concessions. Under globalization, difference does not disappear but it is rearticulated (Laclau and Mouffe, 1984), in ways which now advantage global capital to a greater extent than before. Just as the reality of globalization is in a sense produced by action motivated by the mythology of globalization (see Cameron and Palan, 2004) so are differences and locality - and how these are combined reveal the underlying political dynamics of transnational politics. Close observation of transnational corporations in the current context sees them actively playing off regions, nations and continents through discreet bargaining and references to investment and dis-investment. What we see as part of the armory of transnational corporations is a fascination with difference and with using the contours of regulatory difference and cultural cleavages. In effect power rests on a complex set of practices precisely because the establishment of a cultural and ideological hegemony at the transnational level is difficult in a context of a truncated transnational cultural and political space.

What this means is that before we embark on the discussion of transnational corporations and globalization we must be wary of economic reductionism which equates power with economic resources. In effect, as Mouffe (1993) argues the political is not just about formal engagement or coercion but the realization of the impossibility of control, and the understanding that tensions and fault lines emerge in all political discourses and process. The process of management control within transnational corporations has a coercive as well as a consensual dimension because in itself whipsawing and the use of resources and investment as either ‘carrot’ or ‘stick’ cannot create coherent internal systems of governance based on trust and longevity (Ferner and Edwards, 1995). Hence cultural strategies and negotiation are a vital part of the reality of these issues.

III. The Global labour movement in an Age of Rollerball Capitalism

Long a marginal adjunct to the discipline, labour trans-nationalism has in recent years come onto its own as a core topic in industrial relations research. This literature has covered the ways in which, in the face of the shifting structures of global network capitalism, union adaptation occurs through both transnational networking and alliances with local management. Neither of these, at present, holds out the prospect of replacing national unions in their role of regulator of competition between workers. Nonetheless, despite the rush of publications dealing with the various transnational activities of trade unions, the field remains underdeveloped partly due to the nature of the discussions which tend to be aspirational in the main and not always anchored in terms of concrete empirical research (see Martinez Lucio, 2005/07 for a discussion). There is a tendency to contrast the pessimistic debate in terms of globalization and decline of labour with a curious optimistic debate around social and network

based unionism. For example, Greer and Hauptmeier (2008) identify what they see as two dominant trends in transnational industrial relations research: optimists, who show how it can, or does, work in specific situations, and pessimists, who emphasize labor's relative helplessness against management-devised competitive frameworks.

With few exceptions, studies are either ruthlessly empiricist, or float off into a speculative fairyland of working class triumphalism.³ It is still not clear what "labor transnationalism" means exactly, who the players are and what kinds of analytical frameworks might be used to understand their activities. What is more, they tend to come under the spell of the debates on new forms of organizational structures and relations such as networking. New theory based frameworks must develop in interaction with the now substantial empirical evidence available, but to do this requires moving beyond nation-based frameworks. In the past, national systems provided stable referent points for determining the relevant actors, and the rules regulating their relationships, but the components and the boundaries of these national systems are no longer stable – in limiting analysis to national systems, we run the danger of missing key dynamics and actors. The development of the *varieties of capitalism* debate is a case in point where the study of the international is still bounded in terms of the politics and processes of national institutions (Kettunen 2007; Lillie and Greer 2007): the same can be said of the national business systems debate. While it is increasingly clear that national industrial relations systems can no longer be understood in isolation, we still lack a framework for understanding how the global industrial relations framework is emerging and developing.

The International Labour Movement Arena

Labour unions' basic power resource is the ability to regulate competition between workers, through mobilizing the active participation of the workers themselves. Harnessing worker participation relies on constructing a narrative of worker rights and the dignity of labor at odds with capital's narrative of market inevitability through globalization and competition. Hence the Marxist concern with the development of class consciousness: certain forms of consciousness lead to more powerful class capacities than others, and how consciousness is constructed and deployed through organizations matters in terms of labor movement power (Lembke 1989). Controlling competition requires not only that workers internalize class based norms, but also that resistance can be harnessed around an economically based strategy. The usual way in which this is achieved is through democratic-centralist structures encouraging participation but also obliging members to actively support certain basic norms, and policies which have been democratically decided.

Above the national level the essential problem is the tenuous connection between international union organizations and the rank and file to be mobilized (Turner 1996), and the lack of strong cross-cutting norms to counter capital's dominant narrative of globalization and competition. The fact that transnational union cooperation is in practice achieved through networks rather than hierarchical and formalized organizational relationships results in a lack of control and strategic direction, undermining the ability of unions to regulate competition between firms, countries and production sites. At the national level the labour role varies, but it is usually part of the complex regulatory processes and spaces which traverse the economy and condition the behavior of capital (MacKenzie and Martinez Lucio, 2005). In effect, the international dimension of labour does not exhibit the same types of reciprocal relationships between the state, capital and labour (and other bodies) that exist at the national level and below. The international arena is characterized by less dense and embedded systems of regulation and organizational relations.

The global labour movement largely consists of the parallel structures of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), and the Global Union Federations (GUFs). All these international union bodies are federations of national union affiliates, who fund them, govern them, and appoint their staff. The problem for global organized labor is not only that it mirrors the nation state in structure and construction (Stavis 1999) – producing various national projects as unions try to

regulate and close their economic spaces - but that the international dimension of labour is secured in terms of national structures of representation and lobbying within international organizational structures (Lillie and Martinez Lucio, 2004). As international actors, unions carry the cultural and regulatory habits of their respective home countries but interact in an arena lacking the corresponding players and reciprocal relations that lead to concrete and substantive outcomes in terms of social wages and rights. In this respect, they are not fundamentally different than corporations, as the business literature on country-of-origin effects demonstrates (Harzing and Sorge 2003). However, unlike corporations, unions almost never operate in more than one country, or merge across national boundaries. Practically all transnational union activity occurs on a network basis, as cooperation between independent organizations.

What is more, these international labour organisations are organized around sectoral structures that reinforce the political and sectoral boundaries of capitalism. In effect, labor mode of organization creates structures, modes of understanding and discourses that lock labour into the very structures of capital. Despite the fragmentation it creates, this is essential and inevitable. The labour movement has to work through – pardon the pun – the way work and the labour process is organized. It has to manage through the ways in which the working class is made and developed. However, the problem is that the labour movement crystallizes these relations and sediments them around bureaucratic structures. This is the classical Marxist concern with unions as a reflection of capital (Hyman, 1970). In the context of increasing globalization we realize that labour becomes almost the residue of modern, national capitalisms, and is unable to find platforms and practices for a less nationally oriented system.

The degree to which the global working class is fractionalized by national boundaries is changing in part through deliberate top-down union strategy. Although Cox observed 35 years ago that transnational labour union activity was then the prerogative of relatively senior officials in national union organizations (Cox 1971), over the past two decades unions have developed extensive multi-level cooperation, with worker representatives throughout union hierarchies drawn into transnational union activities. At the start of the 21st century, the institutional structure of the global labour movement is becoming more substantial, with industry level GUFs more experienced and better resourced, and with more company level inter-union networks being established. There is a definite sense of a coherent global “movement,” even if there is a lack of consensus and coordination on specific issues. Nonetheless, although the labour movement is beginning to imagine a political landscape of international organisation in terms of functions and processes, it still lacks the structures, resources and consensus to serve as an effective counterweight to transnational capital.

Mediation through Networks and the Construction of Solidarity

Many have begun to visualize alternatives to this national ‘sticky’ model of employment regulation and trade union development. Out of necessity, as this appears the only path available, transnational union cooperation tends to be network based. Some labor scholars, following the example of the New Social Movements, with their perceived flexibility and egalitarianism, have made a virtue of this necessity, to the extent of advocating organizing the global labour movement along the lines of transnational “rank and file-ism” instead of through bureaucratic structures (Moody 1997 – see Martinez Lucio 2005 and 2007 for a discussion). It is clear, however, that these rank and file networks, in most cases, do not intend to replace bureaucratic trade union structures. Rather, on some occasions, they supplement them, and on others seek to influence them. When they must, they stand in for them, but generally only to fight the battles which the bureaucratic labor movement has already abandoned (Castree 2000). There is competition between these different international movements and ambivalence in parts of the organized labour movement with regards to them (Hodkinson, 2003). These networks and new forms of engagement with capital vary considerably in terms of their character, capacities and politics (Martinez Lucio, 2007). The cult of the new network union can sometimes be as much a mythical development - or aspiration - as a real one (see the work of Waterman, 1998). The effect of mediation through networks is that trade unionists come together in

transnational contexts not as members of a coherent class, but as representatives of parochial groups of workers who at best feel limited and abstract solidarity with one another. Strategically, unionists have an interest in promoting transnational solidarity, but often find themselves constrained by their constituents. As Sidney Tarrow (2005) shows, this is common in transnational networking dynamics. Tarrow notes that while intermediaries who connect the parts of transnational movements gain influence over the manner in which issues and contentious repertoires are transnationalized (Tarrow 2005: 209), achieving consensus is also complicated by the demands of domestic constituents whose views are not as heavily influenced by transnational contacts (Tarrow 2005: 161-163). Although unionists involved in international work have some room to shape strategy to be more solidaristic and less competitive, they also refer constantly back to the need to preserve the jobs of their members, and to abide by national collective agreements and labour laws. In some respects, this is merely a case of the glass being half-empty rather than half-full -- trade unionists in international work, using their positions in the centre of inter-union networks, have power to shape the character of the global labour movement, but this power is usually too limited to build authoritative structures to control global inter-union competition (Anner et al. 2006). As with firms organizing production through networks rather than internally, flexibility comes at a cost in terms of loss of control (MacKenzie, 2001). Unlike firms, however, unions appear not to have other alternatives; they are bound by national regulatory systems in different ways, and have difficulty breaking free to form membership-based transnational organizations.

Reliance on networks rather than hierarchical organization ensures that each instance of substantial cooperation become a collective action problem – i.e. a prisoner's dilemma (Martinez Lucio and Weston, 1995), of greater or lesser degree. The lack of reciprocity between actors in terms of international networks or in such consultative forums as European Works Councils (where worker representatives consult within specific transnational corporations) means that worker representatives from different countries cannot trust other colleagues in terms of the way they relate to their own national cadre of managers and build 'productivity coalitions'. For example, whilst there may be framework agreements or general commitments to support employment across the different factories of a company, representatives are never sure that others will follow suite. This emerges due to the lack of ongoing regulatory roles and relations across nation states. This may have changed in such contexts as the European Union, as we argue below where there is an embryonic system of regulation, but even then there are real problems of creating dense and embedded systems of regulation and ongoing agreements (formal and informal).

Furthermore, labour movement power emerges not only from trade union organization for mobilizing (and demobilizing) a disciplined working class, but also out of class consciousness: i.e. norms of solidarity and informal repertoires of collective action which can emerge organically from common experiences of repression. Working class consciousness tends to be heavily tied into national identity. Labour historians and sociologists have typically looked at how relations in workplaces and communities build ties of solidarity among workers in frequent contact with one another. Workers in the same workplace and same geographic space rely on one another at work, share social networks in community and leisure activities, and find common cultural reference points (cf. Brody 1993; Kimeldorf 1988; Gilbert 1992; Koo 2001). All these supports for class formation either do not exist or are much weaker across national boundaries.

The ways in which global capital undermines national class compromises also serves to build commonalities of interest between workers in different countries, and between the global North and South (O'Brien 2004), providing a structural basis for transnational class formation. Worker migration also brings more direct contacts between workers, and sometimes spurs contacts between unions as well. Lillie and Greer (2007), for example, show that construction unions in some cases have made cross-border ties to deal with the issues of migrant construction workers in the EU. However, it is also true that this effect is limited by employer strategies that seek to isolate migrants from their host societies in order to more effectively exploit them (Lindio-McGovern 2004; Hunger 2001). What is

more there is the challenge of configuring the international dimension and vision of class consciousness which is not based simply on coordinated collective action and strikes, as if this was not hard enough anyway. Organic development of class capacities is not independent of labour movement agency. Richard Hyman underlines the importance of unions as “schools of class struggle” in generating working class capacities (Hyman 2001). Because weak and fragmented class consciousness constrains union strategy and undermines union power resources, it is in the interest of the labour movement to encourage the growth of a transnational working class consciousness. To some degree the challenges facing the labour movement may be due to the inability or unwillingness of many contemporary unions to play such a role as an integral part of their day to day national activities - seeing it more in terms of a supplement. Certainly, it is unusual for trade unionists to see imparting a transnational class consciousness as an important part of their everyday work.

Technical advances, such as use of email and web technology, as they spread deeper into society, may create a basis for class formation, interaction and politics in virtual spaces. Unions have used the internet strategically to support campaigns and so on. The widespread growth of internet access goes beyond the uses unions have put it to, defying hierarchical strategic direction, and facilitating direct contact between workers in dispersed geographical locations. As Martinez Lucio and Walker (2004) point out, “there is a political dimension to way the internet is approached which means that it raises the possibility for...a broader range of activity beyond the formal remit of trade union hierarchy.” Mediation by technology comes with its own problems of course, such as uneven access, but the spread of communications technologies and the emergence of global communities of interest within virtual spaces make possible a degree of direct contact which can compensate for the lack of traditional sources of solidarity. The fact that new spaces of trade union and activist dialogue are emerging is the subject of increasing interest (Greene et al, 2004). However, there are challenges in the way these emerge and sustain themselves across time and space. In part this is due to the fact that the very exchange of information may highlight the presence or absence of reciprocal class and trade union action across boundaries but on its own - beyond the role of ‘shaming’ – it does not coerce and compel trade unionists into solidaristic behavior.

IV. Conclusion: Regulation, Competition and the Obscure Object of Solidarity

This issue of economic and regulatory context, and its continuing influence, needs consideration in terms of the impact of such strategies in the medium and longer term. As corporations act transnationally, they create a need for regulatory actors (such as trade unions, amongst others) to communicate and co-ordinate. This creates new networks of co-ordination and information exchange, while at the same time undermining the ability of those networks to cohere. There is a dialectical and dynamic aspect to this, alluded to in the Rollerball film, as the figure of Jonathon E overcomes constant attempts by the world’s corporate executive rulers to rethink the Rollerball game so as to avoid any possible undermining of it by individuals. Although the game becomes more and more violent with the aim of undermining him as an emergent figure against corporate capital, he continues to win. The final scene sees the player vanquish all in a game meant to have no winners but the system – yet what he triumphs for is unclear as all he has really won is a game invented by corporate capital. Somehow we are left thinking that the real challenge may not be how competition is constructed and then re-regulated, but how the obsession with (or, in the Rollerball, the life or death necessity of) winning has distracted from the construction of a counter-discourse, leaving the final victory empty of any real meaning. Likewise, unions and national working classes which have bought into constructing the national competitive “us” (Kettunen 2004) may lack the tools for building collective alternatives. As we begin to see that globalization is about difference, competition, whipsawing and control we are left with the task of seeking a moral and social basis for its regulation without a global platform partly because global transnational corporate, academic and policy views have been about negating it. Becoming the regulator also means forming legitimate and sustainable ethical, moral and social vision of a new system (MacKenzie and Martinez Lucio, 2005), and as we saw in Rollerball that is something the companies failed to do: games and competition in themselves

are not enough. Yet there are contradictions with this system which provide a basis for union and worker co-ordination, and the paper suggests that this is becoming a vital part of the debate on globalization.

Anner, M./Greer, I./Marco, H./Lillie, N./Winchester, N. (2006): The Industrial Determinants of Transnational Solidarity: Global Inter-union Politics in three Sectors. In: *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 12(1): 7-27.

Burawoy, M. (1985) *The Politics of Production* London: Verso.

Brody, David (1993) *Workers in Industrial America : Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggle*. Oxford University Press.

Castree, N. (2000) "Geographical scale and grass-roots unionism: the Liverpool dock dispute, 1995-98," *Economic Geography* 76, 3, 272-92.

Cameron, Angus and Ronen Palan (2004) *The Imagined Economies of Globalization*, London: Sage.

Cox, R. (1971) "Labor and Transnational Relations," in R. Keohane and J. Nye, Jr. (eds),

Transnational Relations and World Politics, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 204-234

Ferner, A. and Edwards, P. (1995) "Power and the diffusion of organizational change within multinationals." *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 1, 2, July, 229-57.

Gilbert, David (1992) *Class, Community and Collective Action: Social Change in Two British Coalfields, 1850-1926*. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Greene, A. M., Hogan, J. and Grieco, M. (2003), "E-Collectivism And Distributed Discourse: New Opportunities For Trade Union Democracy", *Industrial Relations Journal*, 34:4.

Greer, Ian. (2005) *Workers of the World Compete*, PhD dissertation, Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Ithaca, NY

Greer, Ian and Marco Hauptmeier (2008) "Political Entrepreneurs and Co-Managers: Labour Transnationalism at Four Multinational Auto Companies," *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 46:1 March pp.76-97.

Gough, Jamie (2004) "Changing scale as changing class relations: variety and contradiction in the politics of scale," *Political Geography*, 23, pp.185-211.

Hunger, U. (2001) "Globalisierung auf dem Bau," *Leviathan: Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft*, Vol 1, pp. 70-82.

Hyman, R. (1970) *Marxism and the Sociology of Trade Unionism* London: Pluto Press

Hyman, R. (2001): *Understanding European Trade Unionism: Between Market, Class and Society*. London: Sage.

Kettunen, Pauli. 2004. "The Nordic Model and Consensual Competitiveness in Finland," in A-M Castrén, M. Lonkila and M. Peltonen, eds. *Between Sociology and History, Essays on Microhistory, Collective Action, and Nation-building*. Helsinki: SKS/Finnish Literature Society, pp. 289-309.

Kettunen, Pauli. (2007) "The National Welfare State as a Cross-National Historical Construction," paper presented to the conference: *Reform der Sozialpolitik: Zwischen Pfadabhängigkeit und transnationaler Konvergenz*. Georg-August Universität Göttingen, Germany, 6-7 July, 2007.

Kimeldorf, H. (1988) *Reds or Rackets?: The Making of Radical and Conservative Unions on the Waterfront*, Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Koo, Hagen. (2001) *Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1984) *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* London: Verso

Lembcke, Jerry (1988) *Capitalist Development and Class Capacities : Marxist Theory and Union Organization*. Greenwood Press.

Lillie, N. (2004): Global Collective Bargaining on Flag of Convenience Shipping. In: *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 42(1): 47-67.

Lillie, N. (200) *A Global Union for Global Workers: Collective Bargaining and Regulatory Politics in Maritime Shipping* New York: Routledge

Lillie, N. and I. Greer (2007) "Industrial relations, migration and neo-liberal politics: the case of the European construction sector," *Politics & Society*, 35(4), December, 2007, pp 551-581.

- Lillie, N. and Martinez Lucio, M. (2004) "International Trade Union Revitalization: The Role of National Union Approaches," in C. Frege and J. Kelly, eds., *Varieties of Unionism: Strategies for Union Revitalization in a Globalizing Economy* Oxford: Oxford University Press 159–80.
- Lindio-McGovern, L. (2004) "Alienation and Labor Export in the Context of Globalization: Filipino Migrant Domestic Workers in Taiwan and Hong Kong," *Critical Asian Studies*, 36:2, 217-238.
- MacKenzie, R. and Martínez Lucio, M. (2005) 'The Realities of Regulatory Change: Beyond the Fetish of Deregulation' *Sociology* June
- Martinez Lucio, M. (2007) 'Dimensions of Internationalism and the Politics of the Labour Movement: Understanding the politicopolitical and organisational aspects of labour networking and co-ordination' International Industrial Relations Association (Europe) Manchester September
- Martínez Lucio, M. and Walker, S. (2005) 'The Networked Union? The Internet as a Challenge to Trade Union Identity and Roles' *Critical Perspectives in International Business* 1, I. 2/3: 137-154.
- Martinez Lucio, M. Walker, S. and Treverrow, P. (2006) 'Trade Union Renovation and Co-ordination in Europe: The use of the internet and its impact on traditional structures' paper presented to the *Industrial Relations in Europe Conference* Slovenia 2006
- Martinez Lucio, M. and Weston, S. 'New management practices in a multinational corporation: the restructuring of worker representation and rights?' *Industrial Relations Journal*, June 1994 110-121
- Martinez Lucio, M. and Weston, S. (1995) 'Trade Unions and Networking in the Context of Change: Evaluating the Outcomes of Decentralisation in Industrial Relations', *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 16(2): 233-51.
- Moody, K. (1997). *Workers in a Lean World: Unions in the International Economy*, London: Verso.
- Mouffe, C. (1993) *The Return of the Political* London: Verso
- Mueller, F. and Purcell, J. (1992) 'The Europeanisation of Manufacturing and the Decentralization of Bargaining: Multinational Management Strategies in the European Automobile Industry' *International Journal of Human Resource Management* 3(1): 15-34
- Przeworski, Adam (1985) *Capitalism and Social Democracy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Radice, H. (1999) 'Globalization. Labour and Socialist Renewal' *Conference: 'The World Crisis of Capitalism and the Post-Soviet States'* Moscow October 30th - November 1st 1999
- Silver, B. (2003) *Forces of labor: workers' movements and globalization since 1870*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Strange, G. (2007) 'From 'embedded liberalism' to 'negotiated openness'- British trade unions and the European Union from the 1960s: A world-order approach', *Capital and Class* Special Issue: The Left and Europe, No.93
- Stavis, D. (1998) "International Labor Organizations, 1986-1997: The Weight of History and the Challenges of the Present," *Journal of World Systems Research*. 4: 52-75.
- Tarrow, S. (2005) *The New Transnational Activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Waterman, P. (1998) *Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalism* London: Mansell

¹ The film was directed by Norman Jewison based on a short story written by William Harrison, who also wrote the screenplay.

² 'all we ever ask is that in return for what we provide is that corporate decision making is never questioned' (Bartholomew, Head of the Houston based corporation in the film *Rollerball* played by John Houseman)

³ We will resist the temptation to categorize particular contributions as belonging to one category or the other at this point, except to note that Lillie (2004) falls into the first, and Lillie (2006) the second.